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In the nineteenth century, the term “case-lawyer” was used as a label for lawyers who seemed to 
care more about locating precedents applicable to their current cases than understanding the 
principles behind the reported case law.  Criticisms of case-lawyers appeared in English journals 
in the late 1820s, then in the United States, usually from those who believed that every lawyer 
needed to know and understand the unchanging principles of the common law in order to resolve 
issues not found in the reported cases.  After the Civil War, expressions of concern about case-
lawyers increased with the significant growth in the amount of published law after private 
companies entered the legal publishing market. By the turn of the twentieth century, it was 
generally acknowledged the number of cases had made it impossible for attorneys to not focus on 
locating precedents.  In the twentieth century most references to case-lawyers were historical, 
even as the amount of published law facing lawyers continued to grow. 
 
I. Introduction: “A Mere Case Lawyer Can Never be a Great One”1 
“If I were judge and wore the wig, 
 Into merits I'd try to dig, 
 And reason and right would govern my course, 
 Instead of demanding a case on all fours; 
 For I'd decide the cause on principle just, 
 Instead of on precedent covered with dust, 
 And the case lawyer'd get it right in the neck, 
 If I were judge, and on the deck.” 
 
  G. P. Nevitt, If I Were a Judge, 27 LAW NOTES (Edward Thompson Co.) 20, 20 (1923) 
 
The final stanza of G.P. Nevitt’s poem captures the essence of a debate familiar to American 
and British lawyers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  The term “case-lawyer” was 
used through much of the nineteenth century to disparage lawyers who apparently cared more 
about locating direct precedents to resolve their current cases than understanding the legal 
principles behind the reported case law.  Criticisms of case-lawyers appeared in English journals 
in the late 1820s, then in American periodicals as barriers to entering legal practice in the United 
States were lowered, the number of lawyers increased, and the issues they faced grew more 
complex. The criticisms came mostly from those who believed that all lawyers needed to know 
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and understand the unchanging principles of the common law in order to resolve issues not found 
in the reported cases.  By mid-century, regular criticisms of the “mere case-lawyer” could be found 
in American legal periodicals. After the Civil War (1861-1865), expressions of concern about case-
lawyers increased with the significant growth in the amount of published law that followed the 
entrance of private companies into the legal publishing market. Some suggested that the 
introduction of the case method of instruction at Harvard Law School in the 1870s and elsewhere 
later in the century also encouraged the development of case lawyers. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, more writers acknowledged that the ever-growing body 
of published case law had made it impossible for attorneys not to focus on locating precedents.  
During the twentieth century references to case-lawyers became less common, even as the amount 
of published law grew in print, and then in digital formats in the last quarter of the century.  This 
article examines legal periodicals and other sources to explore the connection between the growth 
in the number of published cases and reporters, and the hostility toward case-lawyers in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  
 
II. The Nineteenth Century Growth in Published Decisions  
A. England 
In the early nineteenth century, English courts appointed “authorized” reporters, whose reports 
of cases were supposed to be the only versions allowed to be cited in arguments.2  By at least 1832, 
however, cases published in other reports could be cited if certified by a barrister as his account of 
the case.  These unauthorized collections often (but not always) appeared more quickly than the 
authorized reports and were less expensive, but their publication created problems of duplication, 
variations in text, inclusion of unnecessary material and greater expense for the bar. An 1849 report 
by a committee of the Society for Promoting the Amendment of the Law argued that a new evil 
had arisen in the number of unauthorized versions of the reports being published. 3 As the report 
put it: “Competition, ordinarily productive of so much good, in this instance adds to the evil.”4 
One later commentator described the situation by the mid-1860s as “intolerable.”5 
What were perhaps the first published criticisms of the case-lawyer appeared in several articles 
in the English Law Magazine in 1828-1829.  An article in the magazine’s first issue found that 
“the mere case-lawyer will be liable to continual error from trusting to fancied and incorrect 
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analogies. In short, no sound lawyer ever was or ever will be made by the mere study of particulars. 
The only way to know accurately, is to make sure of the principle ….”6 A later article characterized 
a recent appointee to high office as “a good case lawyer [who] troubles himself very little about 
principles[,] is well acquainted with laws as they are, and neither knows nor cares about their 
origin.”7 Another asked whether a lawyer who understood rules was “necessarily an abler 
practitioner, considered even as a case lawyer, than one whose memory is unaided by principles, 
and who, when an index has supplied him a precedent, can merely state the strict letter of the law.”8 
An 1838 note in the Legal Observer reported on a recent lecture at the end of which the speaker 
acknowledged that he had “been frequent in references to decided cases--not that I by any means 
think that what is called ‘a case lawyer,’ is even practically the best.”9 A few years later, however, 
the Observer commented in a memorial: “It is sometimes the fashion to sneer at what are called 
case-lawyers; but this is only because very few men indeed have the qualifications necessary to 
become such.”10   
Early comments on case-lawyers appeared in articles focused on legal education.  In 1845, a 
short article in the Law Students’ Magazine noted young lawyers’ difficulties appreciating that 
“the law of England is grounded on principles, the study whereof will make the sure and scientific, 
if not the ‘case’ lawyer. . . . Too much reliance upon case law, is apt to make a superficial lawyer, 
who becomes by habit, a mere index hunter.”11 Commenting on the state of English and Irish legal 
education, Henry Joy wrote that the main objective should be to ground students in the knowledge 
of principles; not to train “mere mechanical collector[s] of cases.”12  Joy found that found that 
case-lawyers were increasingly common in England and Ireland because the courts overly 
encouraged the citation of cases and because of “the amazing number of reports.”13 The 
multiplicity of reports made it impossible for lawyers to get back to first principles, “‘mak[ing] the 
profession one of technicalities, to be acquired by the exercise of the power of memory rather than 
a philosophy to be acquired by the developement [sic] of the reasoning powers.’”14 
A lengthy period of agitation and study resulted in the 1865 establishment of a Council of Law 
Reporting, with responsibility for appointing each court’s reporters and supervising publication of 
the reports. 15  Publication of the newly authorized Law Reports began publication almost 
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speaking of, that, since he left school, he has never read any but law books.”). 
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Law Book as the ne plus ultra of a learned treatise, are now in the habit of depreciating [sic] those same books, and 
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12 HENRY HOLMES JOY, LETTERS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND 12 
(1847). 
13 Id. at 13-14. 
14 Id. at 15-16, quoting “Mr. Maconochie, a member of the Scottish bar.” 
15 See generally DANIEL, supra note 3, at 3-27.  See also HOLDSWORTH, supra note 3, at 2-3; DAWSON, supra note 3, 
at 81-82; DAVIES, supra note 3, at 27 
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immediately, initially in eleven series, then in six after 1873 and in four since 1881.16  The new 
system did not end publication of other reports. Looking back in 1884, W.T.S. Daniel wrote: “It 
may be a matter of regret with many that the successful establishment of “The Law Reports” has 
not had the effect of relieving the Profession from what is thought to be the incubus of so many 
contemporaneous Reports.”17 
B. United States 
At the time of the American Revolution few published court reports were available to domestic 
lawyers. Only half of the approximately 150 volumes of reports published in England had been 
imported, and “no more than thirty were in familiar use on this side of the Atlantic.18 Roscoe Pound 
later observed that the repositories of law available to domestic lawyers were limited largely to 
Coke’s Second Institute and Blackstone’s Commentaries.19 One early commentator noted that “[a]t 
the close of the revolutionary war, and for full ten years afterwards, a book of American reports 
was scarcely to be met with in any one of the states.”20 Another noted that before 1800, “[t]he best 
library of American reports that could be summoned by money or magic … might have been borne 
[in] the circuits in a portfolio.”21   
Early court reporters noted the difficulties posed by the lack of American reports.22 Not only 
were domestic reports important to the daily work of the practicing bar, they were necessary to 
promote uniform administration of justice and to distinguish American common law from that of 
England.23 Twenty-five years after the start of the American Revolution most American 
jurisdictions still depended largely on the available English law reports.24 Fred Hicks counted but 
five volumes of American reports in 1801 and eighteen in 1810, and lists only sixteen “more 
                                                          
16 GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, LEARNING THE LAW 37 (12th ed. 2002). 
17 DANIEL, supra note 3, at 324. 
18 HICKS (1923) supra note 2, at 111.  
19 ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1938). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (3d. ed. 2005). (“In one sense, colonial legal literature is quickly disposed of: no 
such thing worthy of the name existed before 1776.”).  See generally M.H. HOEFLICH, LEGAL PUBLISHING IN 
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 14 (2010).       
20 [Richard Rush], American Jurisprudence, 2 CAROLINA L. REPOSITORY 347, 347 (1816)  
21 [Nathaniel Haven], Greenleaf’s Reports, 22 NORTH AM. REV. 27, 29 (1826).   
22 See Preface, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) iii, iii (1804) (“Much of that uncertainty of the law, which is so frequently, and 
perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this country, may be attributed to the want of American reports.”). See 
also Preface, EPHRAIM KIRBY, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT iii, iii-iv (1789) (describing the need for publication of domestic opinions). 
23 Denis P. Duffey, Jr., Genre and Authority: The Rise of Case Reporting in the Early United States, 74 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 263, 264 (1998).  See also Thomas J. Young, Jr., A Look at American Law Reporting in the 19th Century, 68 
LAW LIBR. J. 294, 296 (1975); William E. Nelson has emphasized that because of the “different origins of their 
founders, there were “tremendous differences … among the legal systems of the early colonies” and that “[o]nly 
after 1800, if not by 1776, … it became possible to speak of American law … as a set of organizing principles” for 
treatise writing, legal education, and deciding cases.  WILLIAM E. NELSON, 1THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL 
AMERICA 6 (2008).  
24 John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547, 572-74 (1993). 
See also Francis R. Aumann, American Reports: Yesterday and Today 4 OHIO ST. U.L.J. 331, 332-335 (1938) 
(noting the level of public sentiment against the use of English precedents in American courts); HOEFLICH, supra 
note 19, at 6-7 (“This was a period of extensive legal syncretism of American and English law.  English law was 
neither wholly rejected nor wholly accepted….). 
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important volumes” of American reports published between 1789 and 1803.25  As the states began 
appointing official reporters, reports were published more frequently. Published reports facilitated 
access to out-of-state decisions and gave the legal profession a shared literature, making possible 
the idea of a national common law.26 New volumes were often reviewed and critiqued in journals 
of general interest, then later in specialized legal periodicals.27  In an 1821 address, Joseph Story 
found that “[t]he best of our reports scarcely shrink from a comparison with those of England in 
the corresponding period; and even those of a more provincial cast exhibit researches of no mean 
extent, and presage future excellence.”28  
Although they praised the quality of the new reports, Story and other antebellum lawyers were 
wary of the effects of the increasing numbers of published cases on lawyers’ ability to know the 
law.29  Story estimated that by 1821 “[m]ore than one hundred and fifty volumes of reports are 
already published” and warned not only of being “overwhelmed with their number and variety,”30 
but being “buried alive, not in the catacombs but in the labyrinths of the law.”31  An 1824 review 
of several recent volumes of reports counted 198 volumes of American reports, then asked: 
“Whither is this rapid increase in reports to lead us, and what are to be the ends and consequences 
of it? . . . [W]hat mind will be adequate to the task of storing up the infinite multiplicity of decided 
cases?”32 In the first volume of Commentaries on American Law, James Kent bemoaned “the 
number of books which beset and encumber the path of the student,” arguing that “[t]he evils 
resulting from an indigestible heap of laws and authorities are great and manifest. They destroy 
the certainty of the law, and promote litigation, delay, and subtility [sic].”33   
Others emphasized the practical costs of dealing with so many published reports. The 1836 
edition of Hoffman’s Legal Study complained: “The increase in this portion of our literature within 
the last thirty years, has no parallel in the juridical history of any other country.  More than four 
                                                          
25 HICKS (1923) supra note 2, at 111, 115-16 (1923). The count of 18 volumes in 1810 seems to come from 
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 557 (1911). Warren does not a cite source for his number.   
26 Duffey, supra note 23, at 272-73.  See also FRIEDMAN (2005), supra note 19, at 243-44. (“The ultimate influence 
of the reports can hardly be measured….Judges felt that the common law was a single great language of law.”); 
Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in the Post-Revolutionary Era, 35 NOTRE DAME 
LAW. 44, 75 (1959) (“One of the most remarkable phenomena of the post-revolutionary period . . . was the 
publication of American law reports.”). 
27 See generally Richard A. Danner, More than Decisions: Reviews of American Law Reports in the Pre-West Era 
(2015), http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/3480/; Duffey, supra note 23, at 263 (“Contemporary 
attitudes about the place of the reports in the changing legal landscape were articulated in prefaces to volumes of 
reports and in reviews of reports published in periodicals of the day.”).  Duffey suggests that “The serial form of 
reports may have contributed to the impression of the common law as a flexible, participatory enterprise …. As 
serials, the reports could function not just as a topic but also as a participant in this kind of perpetual civic 
discourse.” Id. at 267-68. 
28 Joseph Story, An Address Delivered before the Members of the Suffolk Bar, at their Anniversary, on the Fourth of 
September, 1821, at Boston, 1 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 1, 13 (1829).  
29 MacGill and Newmyer described the growth in printed American decisions as “exponential.” Hugh C. MacGill & 
R. Kent Newmyer, Legal Education and Legal Thought, in 2 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 36, 42 
(Michael Grossberg &Christopher Tomlins, eds., 2008).   
30 Story, supra note 28, at 13. 
31 Id. at 31.  
32 [Caleb Cushing], Book Review [Recent Reports] 18 N. AM. REV. 371, 377 (1824).  
33 JAMES KENT, 1 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 441-442 (1826).   
6 
 
hundred and fifty volumes of American law reports now load our shelves!”34 An 1839 article in 
the American Jurist & Law Magazine counted 536 volumes and estimated that 30 volumes were 
added each year.35 In 1840, a commentator in The American Jurist feared that “there are many 
young lawyers who find themselves in the dilemma of … [Erasmus], called upon to select between 
law-books and clothes.”36 In 1844, David Dudley Field observed that those lawyers “who have the 
best practice, are tasked almost beyond endurance.  The multiplication of law-books, and, above 
all, the multiplication of courts, have quadrupled their efforts.”37 By 1848, there were an estimated 
800 volumes of reports.38 
 
 
III. Precedent and Principle  
The importance of knowing the principles of law was emphasized in both Great Britain and 
the United States even though approaches to precedent in the two countries had already begun to 
differ by the time of the American Revolution. In the nineteenth century, while Americans 
continued to view precedents “as embodiments of reason and experience” and avoided “too rigid 
a doctrine of stare decisis in particular cases, British common law grew more  rigid.39 A report on 
English law in 1853 commented: “Judicial precedents are  . . .  to use the language of Bentham, 
Judge-made laws, and, when long acted upon, become of equal force with the express enactments 
of the Legislature.”40 In the United States, lawyers of the founding generation recognized the 
importance of stability and certainty, but also believed that “a declaratory understanding of the 
common law [permitted] some form of reexamination of the merits of a prior decision.”41  By 
1876, Benjamin Abbott saw “less subordination” to precedent than earlier, but also found that “the 
extent, variety, and complexity of the questions brought before the courts” had resulted in judges’ 
                                                          
34 DAVID HOFFMAN, 2 A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE PROFESSION GENERALLY 
657 (2d ed., enl. 1836).  In the first edition of his work, published in 1817, Hoffman noted that reports of American 
decisions had been published for only a short period, but that the number “has been increasing almost monthly.” 
DAVID HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY: RESPECTFULLY ADDRESSED TO THE STUDENTS OF LAW IN THE 
UNITED STATES 147(1817).  
35 G.G., American Reports and Reporters, 22 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.108, 141 (1839). 
36 Review of Peters’ Digest of Cases, 23 AM. JURIST 243, 244 (1840).  
37 David Dudley Field, The Study and Practice of Law, in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS 
OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 484, 485 (1884) (unsigned article published in the Democratic Review, 1844). 
38 See HICKS (1923) supra note 2, at 111.  
39 Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, in PRECEDENT AND THE LAW 
111, 116 (Ewoud Hondius, ed., 2007) (“The British command theory pushed English common law towards viewing 
precedent as a form of judicial legislation, while American judges continued to feel themselves constrained to 
discover and respect the common law through reason and judicial precedent, rather than to make it themselves.” Id. 
at 114.).  For discussion of the relationships between precedent and English positivism, and the timing of changes in 
the English approach, see NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 14-19 (2008) (“By the 
middle of the nineteenth century . . . the doctrine of binding precedent was clearly in the making.” Id. at 18.).  See 
generally Id. at 37-48.  See also Jim Evans, Changes in the Doctrine of Precedent in the Nineteenth Century, in 
LAURENCE GOLDSTEIN, ED., PRECEDENT IN LAW 36-72 (1987). Ben-Yishai notes that in the nineteenth century, 
although the “commonality” of English common law “had become too large, too diffuse, and to diverse to be held in 
common … the growing uncertainty in the law provoked a demand for a greater authority of decisions.” BEN-
YISHAI, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
40 Law Reporting Reform (1853) in DANIEL, supra note 3, at 15, 16. 
41 Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 647, 666 (1999). 
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“growing inclination to be advised by past decisions, as well as “more hesitation to decide a 
question until what has been adjudicated upon it has been reviewed.”42 
G. Edward White writes that early American lawyers viewed the common law “as a source of 
timeless principles, consistent with natural justice, founded in reason, conforming to custom, and 
influenced by divine revelation.”43 Joseph Story characterized American law as “a body of fixed 
rules, themselves declarations of pre-existing rights or manifestations of universal principles,” 
declared by the judiciary and embodied in judicial decisions.44 In 1835 Francis Hilliard wrote that 
“in law, as in other sciences, there are certain broad and fixed principles, which …remain 
unchanged amidst the fluctuations of successive ages.”45 In an 1851 lecture, Daniel Lord said 
“[t]here are no new principles of jurisprudence to be discovered…its highest triumphs have been 
in the application of old principles and not in the invention of new.”46 Story, Kent, John Marshall, 
and their contemporaries believed that lawyers should be knowledgeable enough about the 
foundational principles to apply them to new problems without relying on earlier decisions. The 
importance of understanding those principles appeared both in expressions of concern about the 
growing amount of published case law and in discussions of case-lawyers, who were seen as 
willing to ignore broader propositions of law in the search for directly precedential cases. 
The early nineteenth century emphasis on principles was part of a legal culture that Robert 
Ferguson described as “a remarkable symbiosis between law and literary aspiration”47 which 
impacted the training of lawyers and the early bar’s image of who the lawyer should aspire to be.48  
In 1829, Story urged Harvard law students to “addict [themselves] to the study of philosophy, of 
rhetoric, of history, and of human nature,” assuming they already were in “full possession of the 
general literature of ancient and modern times.”49  The emphasis on breadth of knowledge was 
                                                          
42 Benjamin Vaughn Abbott, American Jurisprudence, in THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE REPUBLIC 434, 435 (Theodore 
D. Woolsey, ed., 1876). 
43 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, 129 (2010) (3-4 History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States). See Id. at 118 for a list of the “shifting meanings” of the term “common law.”  
44 Id. at 152, citing Joseph Story, Law, Legislation, and Codes, 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 576, 582 (Francis 
Lieber ed. 1831).  In 1821, despite his pride in the development of American jurisprudence to that point, Story had 
worried that many lawyers had but “imperfect knowledge” of “those general principles, which constitute the 
foundation of actions.” Story, supra note 28, at 27.  Perry Miller suggested that because of his opinions about the 
extent of their knowledge, Story was “cordially hated by the majority of practitioners.” PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF 
THE MIND IN AMERICA 136 (1965). 
45 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW v (1835). As Marshall Bloomfield put it: “Since law was a rational 
science . . .  its basic principles could be grasped by all men.” MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A 
CHANGING SOCIETY, 1776-1876 at 145 (1976). 
46 DANIEL LORD, ON THE EXTRA-PROFESSIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE PULPIT AND THE BAR 16 (1851). 
47 ROBERT A. FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE 25 (1984).  See also id. at 66-72.   
48 Id. at 5.  On the importance of classics-based education in the early Republic, see Timothy G. Kearley, From 
Rome to the Restatement: S.P. Scott, Fred Blume, Clyde Pharr, and Roman Law in Early Twentieth-Century 
America, 108 LAW LIBR. J. 55, 56-60 (2016). 
49 Joseph Story, Value and Importance of Legal Studies Literature and Jurisprudence, in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 527, 528-29 (William W. Story ed. 1852) (quoted in FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 26). 
Gilman Ostrander found that “[t]he best of America’s lawyers were seen to be delving through the civilizations of 
Greece, Rome, and medieval and modern Europe as well as England in the service of legal wisdom.” GILMAN M. 
OSTRANDER, REPUBLIC OF LETTERS: THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY, 1776-1865 at 104 (1999). Bryan 
Waterman argues that James Kent and his associate, New York Supreme Court Reporter William Johnson, believed 
that knowledge of the law “depended on the ‘root’ of broad classical learning, including familiarity with belles 
lettres.” BRYAN WATERMAN, REPUBLIC OF INTELLECT: THE FRIENDLY CLUB OF NEW YORK CITY AND THE MAKING 
OF AMERICAN LITERATURE 148 (2007).  
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reinforced by legal commentators, treatise-writers and others who were developing the new 
American legal system.50   
As the connections between law and letters faded during the Jacksonian period, so did many 
lawyers’ sense of the importance of the kind of education Story favored. Barriers to entry into legal 
practice weakened,51 and the profession grew larger and more heterogeneous.52  The number of 
reported decisions increased as well, and the established bar became more concerned about newer 
lawyers who were less interested in understanding principles than in finding decisions they could 
apply directly to problems at hand.  Established practitioners and judges reminded students and 
younger lawyers that to be successful, they needed to understand the principles of the law. Jesse 
Bledsoe told an audience of Nashville law students that “[a] mere case lawyer, can never be a great 
one.”  If the facts of the reported cases differed only slightly from those of the case at hand and 
did not “vary the principle, he is at a loss for the proper decision.”53  In 1851, a lengthy disquisition 
on the nature and method of legal studies detailed the disappointments awaiting the lawyer who 
“did not begin the study of his profession with a thorough inquiry into its principles.”54  In an 1854 
lecture to Tulane law students, Christian Roselius acknowledged the value of the well-considered 
judicial opinion but emphasized that some opinions disregarded basic principles, making the “mere 
case lawyer … like a third rate player, who repeats the words of others, without troubling himself 
whether he is uttering sense or nonsense.” 55 Alfred Conkling told the graduating class of law 
students at the University of Albany that, if you ask a question of a case-lawyer, “if he happens to 
remember a reported case exactly in point, he will tell you how [the case] has been decided,” but 
not the principle applied. Without that case he would be unable to offer an opinion.56 
In his study of nineteenth century legal thought, Perry Miller observed that by mid-century 
lawyers of “the majestic era of John Marshall…were simply bewildered at [the] rising insistence 
on practicality.”57 Miller was himself “struck with how plaintive became the laments of the 
periodicals that the profession has been subverted by lawyers who regard the law as a mere 
aggregation of arbitrary provisions.”58 
                                                          
50 FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 27. For examples see, MILLER, supra note 44, at 136-37, 140, 146. 
51 See FRIEDMAN (2005), supra note 19, at 236-37.  See also Alfred S. Konefsky, The Legal Profession: From the 
Revolution to the Civil War in 2 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 68, 77 (2008) (“Inevitably the bar’s 
claims to elite status became caught up in the maelstrom of Jacksonian democracy.”); BLOOMFIELD, supra note 45, 
at 85 (describing legislative and judicial efforts to reduce requirements for practice). 
52 Konefsky, supra note 51, at 84-86.  Konefsky found few reliable numbers on the size of the legal profession prior 
to 1850, but concluded that “by 1850 many more men were entering the legal profession, and the relative number of 
lawyers in proportion to the general population had increased significantly.” Id. at 85. 
53 BLEDSOE, supra note 1, at 9 (“Principle, like the pillar of fire by night . . . will be a light to his path, and a lamp to 
his feet.” Id.). 
54 Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG. 379, 383 (1851) (“For the want of any sufficient 
knowledge of general principles, all becomes uncertainty and confusion.”). 
55 Mitchell Franklin, Introductory Lecture of Christian Roselius on November 13, 1854, 32 TULANE. L. REV. 573, 
590 (1958). 
56 ALFRED CONKLING, LEGAL REFORM 11 (1856) (address to the graduating class of the University of Albany Law 
School, March 27, 1856).  
57 MILLER, supra note 44, at 184, citing an 1846 address before the Law Academy of Philadelphia which argued that 
the public would “infinitely sooner entrust business to mere men of practice, of whose learning they know nothing, 
than to those whom they have every reason to believe most firmly grounded in the principles of their professions, 
but of whose practical ability they have no good evidence.” 
58  Id. 
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As legal practice became more complex in the last decades before the Civil War and the amount 
of published law continued to increase, “[n]o lawyer could grasp the whole of the legal system 
because the system simply became too big.”59  Consequently many lawyers felt obliged to master 
particular areas of practice and partnerships started to emerge, prompting what Alfred Konefsky 
called “a subtle move toward specialization… along the lines of specific areas of law…technical, 
complex, and narrow.”60 As put by Ferguson, “[t]echnical competence triumphed over general 
learning and philosophical discourse.”The shift to what he called “textbook law” changed the ways 
that lawyers approached their work: “The early lawyer searched for a declaration derived from 
common usage and consistent with nature.  His successor, the reader of case reports, thought in 
terms of the specific commands that society had place upon itself.  …  The first looked for 
connections and resemblance; the second, for distinction and precision.”61 In an 1852 review of 
the seventh edition of Kent’s Commentaries. Theophilus Parsons noted that “[a]lready, in many of 
our law schools, provision is made for those who enter them, not to become lawyers, but to study 
commercial law.”62 Perry Miller later took the comment to represent two opinions within the 
American bar: “one held that its various departments were so extended that each scholar must 
specialize, the other held to the position . . .  that the law, like all true sciences, springs from a few 
simple principles which can readily be acquired.”63 
For lawyers faced with the growing complexity of the law in the reports, it became enough “to 
find the detail and application of the law without worrying about comprehensiveness and 
theoretical compatibilities.” 64 Bloomfield suggests that Jacksonian and Civil War era practitioners 
“were even more likely than their predecessors to cherish a narrow vocational outlook toward their 
work and to insist on a technical competence that set them apart from their fellow 
men….”65Already in 1832, after noting French lawyers’ “loose and endless citation of decisions 
upon every question,” 66 a review of a French legal treatise found that in the U.S. “a want of correct 
ideas as to the real object and true value of reported decisions, has more than any thing [sic] else, 
led to this unfortunate habit of encumbering [American] Reports with unnecessary and perplexing 
references.”67  An 1840 discussion of legal practice in Maine remembered when: “A good voice, 
a fluent utterance, and a discussion of general principles answered every demand, instead of the 
heavy, ponderous arguments of the present time, larded all over with authorities from all quarters 
of this and foreign lands, and often an endless variety of legal points and distinctions without 
differences.”68 
 
                                                          
59 Lawrence M. Friedman, Heart Against Head: Perry Miller and the Legal Mind, 77 YALE L.J. 1244, 1249 (1968) 
(book review). 
60 Konefsky, supra note 51, at 90-91 (“Typically a partnership was composed of two attorneys who … divided their 
responsibilities between litigation and office practices ….” Id. at 90). 
61 FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 200.  See also Id. at 230-31 (using the example of Daniel Webster to show how “the 
old-style generalist in law was retreating before a more formally trained expert.”) 
62 [Theophilus Parsons], Book Review: Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, 74 N. AM. REV. 108, 117 (1852). 
63 MILLER, supra note 44, at 142. 
64 FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 287. 
65 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 45, at 137. 
66 Anon., The Citing of Authorities, 8 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 111, 111 (1832), reviewing A. M. J. I. DUPIN, DE LA 
JURISPRUDENCE DES ARRÉTS (1825). 
67 Id. at 113.  
68 W., Notes on the Early Jurisprudence of Maine. Number Three, 3 L. REP. 121, 126 (1840). 
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Case-lawyers were criticized for lacking breadth and interest in matters beyond the 
technicalities of law.69 In 1864, Richard F. Fuller opened an essay on “Literary Lawyers” by 
reporting a notion “that the range of a successful lawyer's mind must be strictly limited to his 
calling. To know law, nothing else, it is supposed, must be known. … We recognize this common 
impression in the sneer of the case lawyer at literary accomplishments.”70 Fuller asked rhetorically 
whether Scottish jurist Henry Brougham would have been as accomplished “had he neglected the 
liberal influence of literature, had he kept in ignorance of public affairs, had he left his heart awaste 
[sic], had he been, in short, a merely technical lawyer, or, worst of all, least of all, a mere case 
lawyer?” 71 The case lawyer would neither read a book preface describing the state of the law at 
an earlier time,72 nor peruse articles in a journal not confined to legal subjects.”73 In contrast to the 
images of early nineteenth century lawyers presented by Ferguson, in mid-century the “mere case 
lawyer” was seen as “a narrow-minded, short-sighted pettifogger,” whose “practice of reasoning 
from cases instead of from principles… degrades the profession, and fills the law with absurdities 
and injustice.”74 An 1870 memorial contrasted a lawyer with “a philosophic mind, enlarged by 
extensive reading” with “the mere legal martinet—the case lawyer or empiric, who uses legal 
precedent as the mason uses a brick or stone, the carpenter a stick of lumber….”75  Looking back 
on the period, however, Bloomfield asked whether late antebellum practitioners could be expected 
“to waste time on frivolous cultural pursuits when it took constant effort just to keep abreast of the 
increasing volume of new court decisions”?76  
 
IV. Case Lawyers in the Later Nineteenth Century 
A. The Legal Culture 
In 1937, Wright characterized English law in the 1880s as “still the days of the case-lawyer,” 
who used digests and precedent books to “find the cases you wanted by turning up the appropriate 
heading (as you would find a train in the A B C).”77  At the time, E.S. Roscoe noted that, after 
cases become too numerous, the case-lawyer was no longer “the good lawyer” of the past, “when 
a knowledge of cases was synonymous with a knowledge of main legal principles with an apt 
example of their application.”78 Charles Scott Dickson wrote: “We are every day becoming more 
and more mere case lawyers, and the rapidity with which decisions accumulate nowadays will tend 
to make us still more so. There are, indeed, now few cases in a session which are argued on 
principle alone, apart from the authority of decisions.”79 
                                                          
69See generally FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 66-72.  
70 Richard F. Fuller, Literary Lawyers, 26 MONTHLY L. REP. 177, 177 (1864). 
71 Id. at 186. 
72 Book Review, 13 MONTHLY L. REP. 322, 322 (1850). 
73 Jurisdiction of the Law, 10 AM. L.J. 424, 424 (1851) (“It is well known that this Journal is not confined strictly to 
what the mere plodding case lawyer would denominate legal subjects.” 
74 Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 U.S. MONTHLY L. MAG. 491, 511 (1851). 
75 Henry K. Smith, in L. B. (LUCIEN BROCK) PROCTOR, THE BENCH AND BAR OF NEW-YORK 112, 112 (1870). 
76 BLOOMFIELD, supra note 45, at 151 
77 Wright, The Study of Law, 54 L. Q. REV. 185, 185 (1938) (address delivered to the University of London Law 
Society, at University College, on October 24, 1937). 
78 E. S. Roscoe, Position and Prospects of the Legal Profession, 1 L. Q. REV. 314, 323 (1885) 
79Charles Scott Dickson, Pleading, 9 JURID. REV. 14, 33 (1897). 
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Still, an 1892 review of two new books on the civil law suggested that “[t]he mere case lawyer 
. . . is being superseded by lawyers who . . . have the advantage of some acquaintance with the 
historic study of the development of law, and of being able, to some extent at least, to compare 
their own system with that of other countries.”80  In 1899, an article in the Scottish Law Review 
remarked that study of Roman law was “invaluable,- delivering the practitioner from the intangible 
abstractions of the mere philosopher, and saving him, at the same time, from the misleading 
analogies and confusions of the uneducated case-lawyer.”81 
In the United States, the remnants of the legal culture nurtured by Kent, Story, and others 
disappeared after the Civil War, but many writers continued to resist the idea that knowledge of 
legal principles had become less important. In an 1876 review of the past century in American 
jurisprudence, Benjamin Abbott wrote that, even though their applications had changed over time, 
“the great fundamental principles underlying both the rules and the methods of the science were 
recognized and obeyed then substantially as they are now.”82 Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s 
generally positive review of Christopher Langdell’s first contracts casebook noted that “[t]he 
popular prejudice that a case lawyer is apt to want breadth, has something in it….”83   
By 1886, however, although Holmes continued to emphasize the importance of principles in a 
speech to the Harvard Law Association, he also pointed out that Story’s “simple philosophizing 
has ceased to satisfy men’s minds.”84  It was no longer enough for law teachers “to send forth 
students with nothing but a rag-bag full of general principles—a throng of glittering generalities.”85 
To make a principle worth anything, instructors must show how it would be applied in practice.  
Ferguson writes that Holmes’s emphasis on specialization and expertise, along with his suggestion 
that words conveying legal ideas should be “uncolored by anything outside the law” would not 
have been understood by any early American lawyer.86 
B.  Educating Lawyers  
Throughout the latter part of the century there was discussion of what author John Glover 
termed the “much mooted question” of whether young lawyers should focus on principles or 
precedents.87 In 1873, the Albany Law Journal argued that the law school’s “proper function” was 
“to teach general jurisprudence - law as a science, not a science of precedents, but a broad and 
liberal science of principles.”  The law’s “application to the business of life” could be learned in 
practice.88 Harvard professor Joel Parker emphasized the student’s need “to learn that that the law, 
as a whole, is, necessarily, a mass of principles and rules.”89 Richard Harrington urged an audience 
                                                          
80 Book Review, 4 JURID. Rev. 262, 262 (1892) 
81 Legal Education, 5 SCOT. L. REV. & SHERIFF CT. REP. 125, 127 (1889). 
82 Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, supra note 42, at 436. 
83 [Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.], Book Notice, 6 AM. L. REV. 353, 354 (1871). 
84 The Use of Law Schools [1886], in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 34, 40 
(Mark De Wolfe Howe, comp. 1962), cited in FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 288.   
85 Id. at 41. Responding in 1877 to criticisms that Story’s commentaries lacked practical value, the Central Law 
Journal had argued that “only the case-lawyer with his narrow range of vision … objects to the copious learning 
with which [Story] enriches his pages….” Book Notices, 4 CENT. L.J. 337, 355 (1877). 
86 FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 289-90, citing O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 459, 464 
(1897). 
87 John M. Glover, How to Find the Law, 1 COUNSELLOR 128, 128 (1892) 
88 Where to Begin the Study of Law, 8 ALB. L.J. 49, 49 (1873). 
89 JOEL PARKER, THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD COLLEGE 22 (1871). 
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of law graduates to read cases for the reasoning of the court, in order to “acquire the habit of 
discussing cases from principles and cultivate a keenness of mental vision which will enable you 
to distinguish between apparently conflicting authorities.”90  William Vilas criticized the 
approaches of case lawyers, but pointedly told University of Wisconsin law students that the case 
lawyer was “apt to be by no means a contemptible adversary.  He may not be inventive in strategy, 
but his ammunition will always be dry.”91  
In 1870, Christopher C. Langdell introduced the case method of instruction at Harvard, 
assigning his Contracts students a compilation of cases rather than a text-book.92 In the American 
Law Review, Holmes questioned Langdell’s “seemingly exclusive belief in the study of cases,” at 
the expense of “a rapid and continuous view of the principles deduced from them. And this can 
only be got in the text-books.”93 Would emphasizing study of cases inevitably encourage the 
development of case lawyers?   
Because it was used initially only at Harvard, the implications of case method engendered little 
discussion until other law schools began to consider its adoption in the late 1880s.94 John Chipman 
Gray noted that the “mere verbal similarity” between the labels “case method” and “case lawyer” 
made it possible to use the poor reputation of the case lawyer as if it were “a knock-down argument 
against the method of study by cases,” but pointed out that the method had “no tendency to produce 
lawyers of this type. …It uses the cases merely as material from which the student may learn to 
extract the underlying principles.”95 Writing in the Yale Law Journal in 1892, however, 
Christopher Tiedeman argued that “the legal tyro is not mentally capable of extracting the 
principles of the law from adjudicated cases.”  Thus, most students exposed only to the case system  
would “be impressed with the great weight of judicial precedent, and  … become, what is so 
generally deprecated, a case-lawyer, who thinks the whole business of advocacy consists of 
persuading the court that the cases he cites in support of his side of the controversy, are to be 
followed.”96 For others, such as Langdell’s disciple William Keener, who brought the case system 
                                                          
90 RICHARD HARRINGTON, ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATING CLASS OF THE LAW DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
UNIVERSITY 7-8 (1873). 
91 William F. Vilas, Address before the Law Class at the University of Wisconsin, June 19, 1876, in SELECTED 
ADDRESSES AND ORATIONS OF WILLIAM F. VILAS 19, 40 (1912). 
92 He published the first full version of his Contracts casebook in 1871.  C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES 
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (1871). 
93 [Holmes] (1871), supra note 84, at 354.  There were no similar comments in an earlier review of the preliminary 
version of the casebook.  See Book Notice, 5 AM. L. REV. 539 (1871). An 1872 review of Langdell’s Sales of 
Personal Property casebook noted, however: “We, of course, are not admirers of the mere case lawyer, but this 
system of inductive teaching has no tendency to create such.” Book Note, 6 ALB. L.J. 93, 99 (1872). 
94 See generally, WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL 
EDUCATION 132-47 (1994).  The American Bar Association’s standing Committee on Legal Education issued major 
reports in 1879, and in 1891 and 1892, as more law schools began to use the case method. The ABA Section of 
Legal Education was formed in 1893 and offered regular papers and reports on university legal education. 
95 J. C. Gray, Cases and Treatises, 22 AM. L. REV. 756, 762 (1888). In an address upon the occasion of Langdell’s 
retirement from the deanship, Harvard president Charles W. Eliot noted that “Misapprehension concerning the 
method prevailed for a long time.  It was not perceived that its keynote was discriminating, orderly selection of the 
material to be studied.” President Charles W. Eliot’s Address, IN HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF 
THE NINTH ANNUAL MEETING 69,70 (1895). 1895 Frederick Pollock noted of Langdell that “the study he has 
inculcated by precept and example is not a mere letter-worship of authority.  No man has been more ready than Mr. 
Langdell to protest against the treatment of conclusions of law as something to be settled by mere enumeration of 
decided points.” Sir Frederick Pollack’s Oration, in Id. at 11,17. 
96 Christopher G. Tiedeman, Methods of Legal Education III, 1 YALE L. J. 150, 155 (1892). 
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from Harvard to Columbia, it was “an impossibility for a man to be academically learned in the 
law as a science, and at the same time to be nothing but a case lawyer. The truth is that one of the 
great arguments in favor of the case system is that it deals with both the scientific and the practical 
side of law.”97 
Despite the clarifications attempted by those who used the case method,98 concerns about its 
connections to case-lawyering continued. An 1894 piece in The Law Student’s Helper discussed 
whether students would do better to focus their reading on texts or on cases, concluding that: “The 
text-book, rightly studied, will make him a lawyer; the case, studied as he will study it, can only 
make him a practitioner.…”99 In an 1896 speech, the Helper’s editor expressed astonishment that 
some law schools had “gone so far as to eliminate from their courses the study of Blackstone's 
Commentaries,” resulting in “that pitiable modern product, the ‘case lawyer,’” who without a case 
on all fours was “compelled to sit down with a ridiculous absence of the power to reason.”100  
William P. Black told the graduates of Union College of Law not to burden their minds with 
precedents: “Rather let your general study be to acquaint yourself thoroughly with the principles 
which have been established by, or recognized in the adjudged cases, and to familiarize yourself 
with the proper methods of applying these principles to the determination of the cases in which 
you are engaged…”101 In 1897, Isaac Phillips told the law graduates of Illinois Wesleyan 
University: “A thorough knowledge of the principles of the common law is the abiding light by 
which your daily professional walk must be guided.”102  
In 1892, however, John Glover cautioned: “There are those who will say to the seeker after 
light: ‘Depend upon principle, upon the reason of the thing. The law is pure reason. What is not 
reason is not law. Do not be a case lawyer, one who is continually searching after a similar 
case.’”103  Glover found such advice to be “misleading and dangerous,” pointing out that in many 
cases more than one result was reasonable; if not, every judge would reach the same conclusion in 
similar cases.  Thus, “familiarity with the actual course of judicial decision is absolutely necessary 
to the successful practice of the law.”104 
Concerns that the case method produced case lawyers diminished in the twentieth century, but 
did not disappear completely.  In 1903, at the third meeting of the Association of American Law 
Schools, Simeon Baldwin used his presidential address to criticize the case system, describing “its 
main end [to] be to encourage and assist the student in the study and analysis of judicial 
                                                          
97 William A. Keener, The Inductive Method in Legal Education, 17 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 473, 482-83 (1894).  
98 See e.g., JAMES PAIGE, ILLUSTRATIVE CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW [iii] (1897).  The preface to Paige’s book in the 
“Pattee Series of Illustrative Cases” began by stating: “Teaching the fundamental principles of the law by means of 
actual cases illustrative of the meaning, limitations, and scope of those principles is now admitted to be, I think, the 
most effective method of training young men for the bar….” On the Pattee Series, see Book Notice, 3 YALE L.J. 230 
(1894).  
99 Augustus S. Owen, Hints to a Law Student, 2 LAW STUD. HELPER 123, 137 (1894). 
100 Griffith Ogden Ellis, Some Defects in Our Present System of Legal Education, 4 LAW STUD. HELPER 231, 232 
(1896) (Address before the Annual Convention of the Commercial Law League of America). See also Seymour D. 
Thompson, The Reporter's Head-Note, 2 GREEN BAG 215, 218 (1890) (“When … the case lawyer fails to find a case 
on all fours with the one he has on hand, he is helpless, because he has not trained his mind to the discovery of legal 
principles and to their application to facts.”);  
101 William P. Black, Law and Lawyers, 14 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 331, 336-37 (1882). 
102 Isaac Newton Phillips, Success at the Bar, 30 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 16, 17 (1897). 
103Glover, supra note 88, at 128. 
104 Id. 
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precedents.”105 A 1904 article on “Law as an Academic Study” argued that the existence of case 
lawyers and judges was due to hurried preparation for practice which left them ignorant of general 
principles.106 As late as 1905, Judge Judson Harmon told new law students at the University of 
Cincinnati that they would be taught to avoid becoming case-lawyers “because no case is ever 
quite like another and to tell whether the differences distinguish them or not requires a knowledge 
and application of principles.”107 
A 1921 review of a new Contracts casebook noted that, for better or worse, in a time when  
text books were “wellnigh [sic] relegated to a very subordinate place, . . . [t]he "case system" 'has 
come to stay and . . . . a thorough understanding of it is a necessary part of a lawyer's equipment.”108 
Yet in 1939, a new curriculum at Ohio State was announced with the comment that the changes 
“should make a significant contribution to the developing of the student into something more than 
a mere case lawyer who is helpless if not armed with a case in point.”109 
C. Perceptions of Case Lawyers  
Nineteenth century memorials, tributes, and other articles about particular attorneys or judges 
often noted whether peers considered their subjects to be case-lawyers.  An article comparing 
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr observed that “probably Hamilton comprehended general 
principles with more tenacity of grasp than did Burr; probably Burr was the superior case-lawyer 
and his knowledge of precedents was more comprehensive and accurate.”110 John Marshall was 
noted for rarely citing authorities, but “no reader of any decision ever suspected, or had reason to 
suspect, ignorance or forgetfulness of any principles needed for the just determination of that 
case.”111 The Albany Law Journal reported that “Chancellor Kent, when asked by a hopeful law 
student what made him a great lawyer, laconically replied: ‘Lack of law books,’” then concluded: 
                                                          
105 Simeon E. Baldwin, The Study of Elementary Law, a Necessary Stage in Legal Education, 3 ANN. MEETING 
A.A.L.S. 23, 27 (1903). Baldwin’s criticisms prompted William Rogers’ retort that “I do not think it can be justly 
claimed that the case system tends to make the case lawyer, because I know of no more thorough drill in principles 
than is the careful study of cases.” Proceedings, 3 ANN. MEETING A.A.L.S. 1, 11 (1903) (comments of William P. 
Rogers). 
106 H.B.H., Law as an Academic Study, 7 LAW NOTES (Edward Thompson Co.) 203, 204 (1904). 
107 Address of Hon. Judson Harmon, 50 OHIO L. BULL. 385, 387 (1905).  Harmon felt that “case system” suggested 
that case-lawyers were being trained.  Id. 
108 Book Review, 7 VA. L. REG. N.S. 480, 480 (1921). 
109 A New Curriculum for the College of Law of Ohio State University, 5 OHIO ST. U.L.J. 344, 351 (1939).  See also 
Notes and Personals, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV. 568, 570 (1936) (“To be a capable lawyer one must not only know the law 
and its history, but he must also understand those social, economic, and political forces which give it being . . . . The 
"case" lawyer is a poor lawyer compared with the man who appreciates the nature of law and the principles which 
underlie it.”) (describing a new program of legal education at the University of Minnesota); Percy Bordwell, 
Experimentation and Continuity in Legal Education, 23 IOWA L. REV. 299, 329 (1938) (1936) (“Preparing class 
notes for the cases in the casebooks is not scholarship. . . . They may produce a higher type of case lawyer but the 
product will be a case lawyer just the same.”) (discussing the work of case system instructors).  
110 Geo. M. Curtis, The Bar of the City of New York, 7 YALE L.J. 327, 328 (1898).  
111 John Marshall, 1 AM. L. REV. 432, 435-36 (1867) (Marshall was “certainly, not eminent as a case lawyer.” Id. at 
135.).  Robert Ferguson noted that Marshall cited no court decisions in his “five greatest constitutional opinions.” 
FERGUSON, supra note 47 at 23.  See also THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME 422 (1914) 
(noting that after delivering an opinion, Marshall concluded: “These are the views of the Court on the questions 
involved and our brother Story will furnish the authorities.”); R.P. Taylor, Bards in Ermine: John Marshall, 62 AM. 
L. REV. 801, 819 (1928) (“In his method of approach Marshall was the reverse of what has come to be the too 
common affliction known as the case lawyer.”). 
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“Emphatically he was not a case lawyer.”112  Theron Strong remembered that Francis N. Bangs 
“did not often refer to adjudged cases; he appealed to common sense and the ordinary principles 
of justice” once remarking to Strong that “no man is fit to practice law that is not able to practice 
it without law books.”113 
It was thought that lawyers who understood principles and knew how to apply them were likely 
to be remembered while case-lawyers were “often forgotten within the lapse of a generation.”114 
If a case-lawyer were deemed worthy of being memorialized in the journals, he was rarely a “mere” 
case lawyer, but a judge or lawyer who read cases not only to find precedent, but to improve his 
knowledge of the law.  Oscar Hord knew Indiana case law, but more importantly “[h]is mental 
grasp was such that his knowledge of principles was as full as his mastery of details was perfect.”115 
An obituary of the author and scholar Andrew Abbott noted that “[h]is enormous-field of reading, 
embracing substantially all the decisions of the higher courts in this country and in England” 
allowed him to cite authority on almost any question. Still, Abbott “was by no means a ‘case 
lawyer,’ but considered every question on broad, legal grounds and general principles.”116 New 
York City’s Stephen Nash “was both an arguer from the principles of jurisprudence and a veritable 
case lawyer; but never a case lawyer who could simply make citations without explanations and 
fitting adaptation, as many lawyers crudely do.”117 The Chicago Legal News claimed that Judge 
Van H. Higgins “was considered the greatest case lawyer that ever appeared at the Chicago Bar. 
You could hardly name a legal question but what he could cite a case bearing upon it, giving from 
memory the title of the case, the name of the volume and page where it could be found.” 118  Upon 
his death, the newspaper reported that Judge Higgins “was noted for being able, in his opinions on 
the bench and in his arguments at the bar, to cite all the opinions in the books upon any legal 
question.119 
Good case lawyers were “capable, first, of cracking the judicial nut itself, and, then, of using 
its contents effectively.” A good case lawyer knew principles as well as cases, but “unlike the mere 
theorist” was effective in court.120 U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller urged young lawyers 
not to let “fear of being called a case lawyer” cause them to undervalue reported cases. “No man 
ever fully and thoroughly examined a difficult question of law, or mastered the intricacies of a 
complicated cause, without becoming a better lawyer by the effort.”121 
The case-lawyer was thought more likely to be found in cities than in the “country.”  In 1870, 
the Albany Law Journal found that many successful lawyers began their careers “in the rigid school 
of country practice, where books were scarce [and] thrown upon their own resources, these lawyers 
                                                          
112 Notes, 48 ALB. L.J. 181, 200 (1893) [reprinted elsewhere] 
113 STRONG supra note 112, at 273. Banks’s firm was a precursor to the continuing firm Davis Polk. 
114 Wirt as a Jurist, 2 ALB. L.J. 221, 221(1870).  See also William Wirt, 16 AM. L. REG. 65, 65 (1867) (“aside from 
the renown achieved by meritorious service and high-minded statesmanship, the case lawyer can never be known to 
posterity save by hearsay and impression”). 
115 Oscar B. Hord, 11 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 330, 332 (1888). 
116 Austin Abbott, 4 AM. LAW. 198, 199 (1896) 
117 A. Oakey Hall, Stephen Payn Nash, LL. D., 10 GREEN BAG 325, 329 (1898). 
118 20 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 259, 259 (1888). 
119 Judge Higgins Dead, 25 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 289, 289 (1893) (“While he relied upon case law he was not forgetful 
of legal principles….”). 
120 The Civil Code of the State of New York, - No. II, Relations of Case Law to a Code, 2 ALB. L.J. 408, 409 (1870). 
121 The Study and Practice of the Law, 2 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 82, 82 (1869) (Address of Hon. Samuel F. Miller, of the 
Supreme Court United States, to the Graduates of the Law Department of Iowa University, 1869).   
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framed their arguments upon their own ingenious reasoning, with but little assistance from text-
books or adjudicated cases.”122  Abraham Lincoln’s contemporary Leonard Swett came to 
prominence in Illinois before “the degraded era of the case lawyer and the timid judge . . . [when] 
[e]very man at the bar necessarily became a keen and ready reasoner, or fell off into obscurity.”123 
Whether Lincoln himself should be considered a case-lawyer has been discussed from the late 
1890s into the twenty-first century.124 The Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin noted that, because there 
were fewer law libraries outside the cities, lawyers were forced to rely on reason and principles: 
“There is less recourse to books and the argument of counsel as well as the opinion of the court is 
not padded with lengthy and oftentimes irrelevant quotations. The so-called ‘case lawyer’ is an 
anomaly in the country.”125  Solomon Boyer wrote that a country lawyer “faithfully attended to his 
cow cases, his family settlements, his all-important mineral and water right cases, and many other 
departments of the law of which the average city lawyer knows nothing…, and wins them, too, on 
principles.”126  An appreciation published in 1906 noted that “[t]he country lawyer has few law 
books, but he knows them well. … Of necessity, then, he is not a case-lawyer, but reasons from 
principle rather than from precise authority.”127 
 
V. Impacts of Late Nineteenth Century Reports and Finding Tools  
 
A. Law Reports in England and the United States 
 
By 1885 the Law Reports system had been in operation in England for twenty years. Nathaniel 
Lindley acknowledged it was an improvement over the prior system of authorized reports, but 
noted that the Bar still did not have “one set of reports which is alone to be regarded as containing 
an authoritative exposition of the law as declared and applied.”128  Lindley cited the continued 
publication of other series of reports as proof that the Law Reports “had not wholly succeeded in 
removing the evil that called them into existence,”129 concluding that: “[a] multiplicity of law 
reports is a great evil.  The evil was once intolerable; it may become so again.”130  
                                                          
122 A Word or Two about Law Libraries, 2 ALB. L.J. 332, 333 (1870).  
123 Hon. Leonard Swett, 1 CURRENT COMMENT & LEGAL MISC. 293, 294 (1889). 
124  See e.g., Mark E. Steiner, Abraham Lincoln and the Rule of Law Books 93 MARQ. L. REV. 1283, 1310 (2010) 
(“Lincoln, according to Herndon [Lincoln’s partner], ‘was in every respect a case lawyer, never cramming himself 
on any question till he had a case in which the question was involved.’” Citing WILLIAM H. HERNDON & JESSE W. 
WEIK, HERNDON’S LINCOLN 148 (1889) (Douglas L. Wilson & Rodney O. Davis eds., (2006)).  But see Francis 
Chapman, Lincoln, the Lawyer, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 277, 283 (1935) (“Lincoln had little knowledge of text books or 
decisions, hence he was not and never could be a case lawyer but he relied upon logic and reason, with his 
knowledge of human nature for the winning of his cases. 
125 [Note], 12 WKLY. L. BULL. 129, 129 (1884). 
126 Solomon B. Boyer, [Note], 2 CURRENT COMMENT & LEGAL MISC. 500, 500 (1890).Boyer also pointed out West 
Publishing Co.’s influence on the urban case lawyer: “The city case lawyer is fast learning the beauties of case law 
under the kindly tutelage of the St. Paul reporters, and, perhaps, someday … will realize the great value of the cases 
as a source of correct deduction for the principle upon which his case may be brilliantly won.” Id. at 501. 
127 J.C.M., The Country Lawyer, 10 LAW NOTES (Edward Thompson Co.) 6, 6 (1906). 
128 Lindley, supra note 5, at 137 
129 Id. at 142.   
130 Id. at 149. In 1939 A. L. Goodhart cited Lindley’s hopes that the number of law reports would decrease, but 
found that it had “increased to a marked extent.”  A. L. Goodhart, Reporting the Law, 55 LAW Q. REV. 29, 29 (1939) 
(including list of current titles). 
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In the United States, official reporters were common in state courts after 1850 and decisions 
were published on a timelier basis than earlier.  As the number of decisions issued continued to 
grow, however, the official reporters lacked the resources to keep up.131  In 1867 a reviewer wrote 
that “ [t]o possess a full library now of American law books, is to possess what has cost a 
fortune.”132 Yet, American lawyers still argued for publication of all decisions, no matter how 
many were issued, no matter the costs or the burdens added to their research. The Albany Law 
Journal wrote that, the more cases reported, “the more likely are we to find the opinions and 
judgments of wise and experienced judges upon cases similar to those we may have in hand. And 
we all of us know how valuable is even one good precedent.”133 One result was what James 
Campbell saw as an apparent need “for the display of erudition, which leads men who are 
otherwise candid into garnishing their briefs and treatises with long lists of names taken on trust 
at second hand, or gathered from the Digests, which represent cases that cannot possibly have been 
carefully read, if read at all [and] bear witness to this by repeating misquotations and verbal errors 
that sometimes have marred generations of predecessors.”134 
 
When the number of decided cases increased at higher rates after the Civil War,135 commercial 
publishers were positioned to offer quicker delivery of new opinions than the official reporters, as 
well as easier access to opinions from other states.  As Jessen put it: “[t]he private sector saw 
commercial opportunity in the increasingly untimely publication of official reporters, and also in 
parsing the growing number of opinions in various ways.”136 Some publishers offered selective 
                                                          
Ben-Yishai cites John Leubsdorf for the proposition that “[a] judicial opinion tells many stories and speaks with 
many voices. It is less a single and anonymous utterance of the law than a condensed quarrel, less a line than a 
knot,” then points out that “[if] anything, Victorian reports are vastly more knotty than American ones.” BEN-
YISHAI, supra note 3, at 52, quoting John Leubsdorf, The Structure of Judicial Opinions, 86 MINN. L. REV. 447, 447 
(2001). 
131 In 1859, David Dudley Field estimated that these cases contained two million rules.  DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE 
MAGNITUDE AND IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL SCIENCE: ADDRESS AT THE OPENING OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, SEPTEMBER 31ST, 1859 13 (1859?). 
132 H., The Iowa Reports, 1 W. JURIST 216, 216 (1867).  At the second meeting of the American Bar Association in 
1879, Edward J. Phelps found the law to be “confused and distracted with a multitude of incongruous and 
inconsistent precedents that no man can number.” E.J. Phelps, Annual Address, 2 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 173, 175 
(1879). 
133 A Few Words about Many Reports, 6 ALB. L.J. 331, 331 (1872). In addition, wide publication of decisions 
provided a check on wayward judges: “No judge is apt to decide a case rashly or corruptly, or against the known 
law, if he knows that his decision will be exposed to public notice and criticism.” Id. at 331. The article closed by 
pointing out: “We never hear the complaint made that there are too many books published in the other professions 
and sciences, … and yet we complain of too many books on the law, in the ashes of which it is said are taken up, 
‘the sparks of all sciences in the world.’” Id. at 332. 
134 James V. Campbell, Materials of Jurisprudence, 14 AM. L. REV. 257, 260 (1880) 
135 Hicks estimated that there were 2,000 published volumes of reports in 1871. HICKS (1923), supra note 2, at 111. 
Benjamin Abbott found there were about 2,500 in 1876. Benjamin Vaughn Abbott, American Jurisprudence, supra 
note 42, at 434, 435. In 1882 J.L. High set out the number of published volumes of American reports (2,944, 
including state and federal). J. L. High, What Shall be Done with the Reports, 16 AM. L. REV. 429, 431 (1882). John 
Dillon found 3,798 by 1884. JOHN F. DILLON, LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 380 (1884). 
Hicks reported 8,208 (excluding reprints) in 1910.  HICKS (1923), supra note 2, at 111. 
136 Edward W. Jessen, Official Law Reporting in the United States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND 
INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON OFFICIAL LAW REPORTING, JULY 30, 2004 at 28, 34 (2004), available at 
http://arjd.washlaw.edu/images/symposium04.pdf (last visited February 24, 2016. The Supreme Court’s 1834 
decision in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) had established that the Court’s own opinions could not 
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publication of cases thought to have particular precedential or illustrative value; others provided 
comprehensive publication of appellate decisions, usually in packages of decisions from 
neighboring states. By the 1870s much of the growth in published decisions was driven by 
unofficial versions of the reports.137 
In 1871 Bancroft-Whitney began American Reports, an unofficial series of selected state cases, 
which included both “leading cases” and other cases “useful and important as illustrations of 
established principles.”138  In 1879 the West Publishing Company took a different approach with 
its NorthWestern Reporter, which contained decisions from appellate courts in Iowa, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and the Dakota Territory, and became the model for West’s 
several series of comprehensive regional reporters, eventually known as the National Reporter 
System. 139 As West expanded its coverage, it faced competition in the market for comprehensive 
reporters in some regional markets. At one point, lawyers in twenty states were served by three 
separate series of reports: the official and two commercial series.140  Despite calls for the 
companies to resist competing in the same regions, in August 1885 West announced plans to cover 
all remaining states.141  By 1888, all publishers with similar reporters had ceased their 
publication.142   
                                                          
be copyrighted and the question of copyright in state court decisions was apparently put to rest in 1888 in Banks v. 
Manchester,128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
137 In 1931, Albert Kocourek told the International Academy of Comparative Law that the continuing growth in the 
body of American case law was due largely to the “various parallel reports” issued since the 1870s.” Albert 
Kocourek, Sources of Law in the United States of North America and Their Relation to Each Other, 18 A.B.A. J. 
676, 681 (1932). Kocourek found that, despite their contributions to the bulky masses of American law, the privately 
published “parallel reports” (which included “annotated reports, state-group reports, and special subject reports”) 
each met a professional need and was in wide use. Id. 
138 HICKS (1923) supra note 2, at 125. Practice cases and local cases with no value outside the jurisdiction where 
they were decided were excluded. Id. at 124 (quoting Advertisement to first volume of American Reports).  For a 
contemporary review, see The ‘American Reports’, 2 ALB. L.J. 491 (1871). The success of American Reports 
prompted the company in 1878 to begin publishing a retrospective compilation of important cases, American 
Decisions (published in 1878-88), starting from the earliest reports. American Reports was retitled American State 
Reports in 1888 and continued to 1911.  
139 An 1880 review praised West for how quickly new cases from the five jurisdictions were available in pamphlet 
form, then in full volumes. The Northwestern Reporter, 14 AM. L. REV. 717 (1880).  The Ohio Law Journal 
concluded that West had reached publishing’s “ultima thule of cheapness and perfection.” New Books, 1 OHIO L.J. 
39 (1880). See also Review of Northwestern Reporter, Vol. II, 4 VA. L.J. 642 (1880). 
West had started publishing decisions, mostly from Minnesota, in newspaper format in 1876. West’s newspaper 
was published between 1876 and 1879, first as The Syllabi, then as The Northwestern Reporter.  See W.E. Butler, 
John Briggs West and the Transformation of American Law Reports in THE SYLLABI: GENESIS OF THE NATIONAL 
REPORTER SYSTEM iii, viii-xii (2011). 
140 Note: The Lawyer’s Reports, Annotated, 22 AM. L. REV. 921, 921 (1888).   
141 WILLIAM W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING CO.: ORIGIN, GROWTH, LEADERSHIP 42 (1969) (official West Company 
history). The same month, in an article titled “The Revolution in Law Reports,” The Nation reviewed lawyers’ 
complaints about the law reports, called for “publication of one series to contain all the State reports, issued under 
responsible editorship-something after the pattern of the present English ‘Law Reports,’ and praised West for its 
plans to cover all state and federal courts, while noting the competition from other publishers. The Revolution in 
Law Reports, 41 THE NATION 167, 167 (1885).  In 1885, an observer noted that eleven states were covered by two 
or three companies’ “schemes,” presumably in addition to the official reports.” The New “Reporters,” 19 AM. L. 
REV. 930, 932 (1885). 
142 For specific dates, see MARVIN, supra note 142, at 43, 47-48. 
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In 1882 J.L. High predicted that the rate of increase in published volumes would continue to 
accelerate143 and “lawyers now in practice at the bar may live to see the number of volumes of 
reports in the English-speaking countries exceed twenty thousand.”144 High attributed the growth 
to increased business before the courts and the number of new courts established to handle the 
workload,145 but also blamed court reporters and publishers of official reports who issued as many 
volumes as possible and tended to pad the volumes with material of questionable value.146 
Selective reporters such as American Decisions and American Reports were “directed, not to the 
prevention or curtailing of the multiplicity of reports, but merely to condensing the volumes of a 
given series into a more compact form and into fewer volumes, still leaving the series itself to be 
perpetuated and increased.”147 For High, these were inadequate solutions. 
High wrote only a few years after the start of the NorthWestern Reporter and did not 
discuss the impacts of West’s comprehensive approach on the growth of published reports.  In 
the Ages of American Law, however, Grant Gilmore blamed West for the flood of case law 
and the problems it caused, arguing that the  National Reporter System “may have dwarfed 
the contributions of Langdell, Holmes, and all the learned professors on all the great law 
faculties.”148 Lawrence Friedman has been less harsh, arguing that “lawyers’ own hunger for 
precedent, for case law” drove the publication of more and more cases with the result that they 
“simply gave up any attempt to grasp the whole of the law or stay abreast of it.  They 
concentrated on problems at hand, on the corners of law they dealt with day by day; and they 
grumbled about the expense and the confusion of the law reports.”149 Willard Hurst pointed 
out that a multi-jurisdictional common law legal system based on precedent “was inherently 
costly to work with.  It required time-taking search for authorities.  It called for expensive law 
libraries.”150 
B. Finding Cases 
Case lawyers were criticized for focusing on finding cases matching the facts of their 
current cause. In 1898, the reviewer of a set of negligence cases described a trial in which one 
lawyer read “a case on all fours with the case at bar,” only to have his opponent successfully 
object that the case had no authority for the matter because it involved a cow, while the current 
                                                          
143 High, supra note 136 at 434 
144 Id. at 435. 
145 Intermediate appellate courts, usually with both original and appellate jurisdiction, had been established in six 
states before 1882. See Edward O. Curran & Edson R. Sunderland, The Organization and Operation of Courts of 
Review, in 3 REP. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF MICH. 152, 152-155 (1933). Between 1891 and 1895, six additional states 
established intermediate courts of appeal. Id. at 155.   
146 High described: “Long and discursive head-notes, unduly extended statements of fact, prolix arguments of 
counsel, often printed literally, page by page, from the arguments filed, the only reportorial labor involved being the 
use of the scissors . . . .” High, supra note 136 at 438. He also noted the length of published opinions written as 
“elaborate essays about questions of law involved in the particular case,” often by inferior judges whose rulings 
would be overturned on appeal. Id. at 439.   
147 Id. at 440  
148 GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 59 (1977). 
149 FRIEDMAN (2005), supra note 19, at 475. In his critique of Miller’s The Life of the Mind in America, Friedman 
suggested that “The increasing bulk of American law was due more to population growth, economic development, 
and social diversity” than to the writings of what Miller termed the ‘behemoths of legal scholarship’.”’ Friedman 
(1968), supra note 59, at 1244, 1249 (1968).   
150 JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 308 (1950). 
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case was about a hog. As the reviewer put it: “The moral of this is that, to the case lawyer and 
the case judge it is not enough to satisfy the doctrine of stare decisis that two cases are ‘on all 
fours with each other;’ they must both be ‘hog cases.’” 151    
 An 1888 review of a new digest of cases suggested that case lawyers and judges should be 
called “fact lawyers” because of their obsession with finding cases having similar, preferably 
identical, facts to their case of the moment.    George Chase described the decision-making process 
of a case-judge: “He collects a mass of cases, states the facts and decision in each, and then finding 
them unfortunately in disagreement is in a state of unhappy bewilderment, … and lets his decision 
fall, as likely as not, to the side where the cases are the greatest in number.”152  
West Publishing Co. objectives were not limited to dominating the market for comprehensive 
publication of judicial opinions.  In 1889 John B. West stated: “it is the principle business of 
American law publishers, to enable the legal profession to examine the American case law on any 
given subject, as easily, exhaustively, and economically as possible.”153 In 1887 West began 
publishing the annual American Digest154and in 1897, the 50 volume Century Edition of the 
American Digest: “A Complete Digest of all Reported American Cases from the Earliest Times to 
1896.”155  By the time the Century Edition was completed in 1904, West largely controlled the 
market for digests in the same way that its reporters had taken over the market for publishing case 
law in the 1880s.156  
In 1898 the A.B.A. Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting referred to “an unnamed 
publisher” as “[t]he agency…by which the demand for a multiplicity of decisions has been 
increased, [and which] has in itself provided some remedy for the difficulties which have been 
created.” As a result, “we [now] have uniform systems of reporting and digesting common to all, 
and a basis, at least, of a common system which shall be satisfactory to all.”157 Although it was not 
                                                          
151 Book Review, American Negligence Cases; American Negligence Reports: Current Series, 32 AM. L. REV. 479, 
480 (1898).Years later, Claude Horack told “the old story of the lawyer who sent his young assistant to the library to 
get a few citations to decorate his case which involved the conversion of a horse, bridle, and saddle.”  After 
searching for a few days, the assistant reported that despite finding cases dealing with “the conversion of a horse, 
some of the conversion of a horse and bridle, some of the conversion of a horse and saddle, and he had even found 
cases of the conversion of a bridle and saddle, but he had found no authorities which covered the case of the 
conversion of a horse, and a bridle, and a saddle!” H. Claude Horack, The Bar Examiner and the Law Schools, 8 
AM. L. SCH. REV. 611, 611-12 (1936). 
152 George Chase, Methods of Legal Study--Part 2, 1 COLUM. JURIST 77, 77 (1885) 
153 Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 AM. L. REV. 396, 400 (1889) (written comments of John B. West). 
154 The American Digest was a continuation of Little & Brown’s United States Digest. Two other comprehensive 
digests started publication at about the same. The Digest Publishing Company’s Complete Digest (compiled by 
former editors of the United States Digest) started in 1889 and the General Digest (from Lawyers’ Co-operative 
Publishing Company) in 1890. Each would eventually consolidate with the American Digest. In 1882, J.L. High had 
noted “the large and rapidly increasing number of digests, indispensable in the use of this otherwise chaotic mass of 
reports … forming a large and imposing library in themselves.” High, supra note 136 at 434. 
155 1 CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DIGEST [i] (1897). 
156 The set was supplemented by annual volumes of the American Digest and decennial compilations.  Eventually 
West published separate digests for its regional reporters of state decisions, as well as for individual states, the 
federal courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
157 Report of Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 21 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 437, 441 (1898). 
21 
 
named specifically, West viewed the Committee’s recognition as a formal endorsement of its 
classification system as “the model of modern digesting.”158  
Late nineteenth century lawyers also used legal treatises and encyclopedias to locate cases.  
The earliest American treatises had documented the emerging common law and responded to the 
earlier problems posed by the growing amount of case law, becoming perhaps the most significant 
form of legal writing in the nineteenth century.159 In the latter part of the century, larger numbers 
of treatises were published,160 but were no longer seen as sources for discussion of legal principles.  
Like digests, they were now used as means to locate cases, and were often written by “a second or 
third-rate lawyer, … employed to prepare a text-book on some legal subject, the fundamental and 
governing principles of which he knows little or nothing about.”161 In 1888, Justice Samuel Miller 
reminded University of Pennsylvania law students that “[m]ost of these modern treatises … are 
but digests of the decisions of the courts, and though professing to be classified and arranged in 
reference to certain principles discussed in the book, they are generally but ill-considered extracts 
from the decisions of the courts.”162 
Legal encyclopedias provided a measure of explanatory text along with summaries of 
individual cases.163 The first to take on the specific problems facing late nineteenth century 
American lawyers was Edward Thompson Company’s American and English Encyclopedia of 
Law, which began publication in 1887, and was often cited in the law journals.164 The Cyclopedia 
of Law and Procedure began publication in 1901165 and eventually reached 40 volumes before 
being succeeded in 1914 by Corpus Juris.   
Did access to an extensive law library and the tools to find “everything the courts have said” 
encourage an attorney to become a case lawyer?  Supreme Court Justice Joseph P. Bradley had a 
large library (“probably the finest and largest private law library in the United States”), and was 
                                                          
158 See MARVIN, supra note 142, at 73-74. See also Panel Discussion on the Duplication of Law Books, 28 LAW 
LIBR. J. 291, 321 (1935) (“It so happens that there is a standard classification in this country which seems to have 
met with the approval of the lawyers. . . . I know it has received the approval of the American Bar Association.” 
Comment of Harvey T. Reid, Editor-in-Chief, West Publishing Company). 
159 See generally POUND, supra note 19, at 138-67; A. W. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal 
Principles and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632, 668-74 (1981). 
160 Lawrence Friedman estimates that about one thousand legal treatises were published in the United States in the 
last half of the nineteenth century. FRIEDMAN (2005), supra note 19, at 477 
161 Geo. H. Christy, The Evils of Case-Law, 22 CAN. L.J. (N.S.) 383, 402 (1886) (“the use of such compilations by 
the ordinary practitioner makes him more of a case lawyer than he was before….”). 
162 Samuel F. Miller, The Use and Value of Authorities, 23 AM. L. REV. 165, 165-66 (1889).  In a 1893 report, the 
Virginia State Bar Association said: “We may well be thankful when text-books cease to be digests and become 
treatises, citing a few leading cares, instead of a mass of contradictory decisions  .… They will lead the courts 
instead of following them.” Report of the Committee on Library and Legal Literature, 5 ANN. REP. VA. ST. B. 
ASS’N. 67, 70 (1893).  
163 See generally HICKS (1923) supra note 2, at 232-36 
164 Id. at 240-43.  See also James Cockroth—The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 28 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 
78 (1895); Banqueting a Publisher, 3 AM. LAW. 545 (1895); Encyclopedias, 9 LAW STUD. HELPER 149 (1901). See 
The American and English Encyclopedia of Law, 26 AM. L. REV. 252 (1892).  In 1903 West sued the Thompson 
Company for copyright infringement, claimed the contents of the Encyclopedia were taken from West digest 
paragraphs. See Suit for $1,000,000 Copyright Damages, 65 ALB. L.J. 154 (1903); Infringement of Copyright, 6 
LAW NOTES (Edward Thompson Co.) 227 (1903); Law Book Publishers at War, 11 AM. LAW. 218 (1903) 
165 Its appearance prompted a suit over authorship of the articles.  See B. Jones v. American Law Book Co., 4 BRIEF 
154 (1902). 
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reputed to know “every book in it, as a shepherd knows his sheep.”  But Bradley wasn’t “a mere 
case lawyer; on the contrary he was inclined and loved to discuss points rather on principle than 
by precedent.”166 N.C. Moak was “unquestionably the most accomplished case-lawyer in this 
region, having reduced “the study and handling of cases … to an exact science.”   His extensive 
library, however, may have led him to be “too much addicted to case study and case learning.”167 
The Albany Law Journal, however, suggested that it was “by no means a misfortune to a young 
practitioner that he has not easy access to a large or a complete law library.”168 An 1895 ABA 
committee report suggested that “It is not at all clear but that it would be highly beneficial to the 
profession, the bench and the client, if the fate of the Alexandrian library should befall very much 
the larger portion of the reports of adjudicated cases in all English-speaking countries….”169 
Contemporary digests and other finding tools drew mixed comments.  An 1889 letter to the 
Green Bag noted the need for better indexing of the facts of cases: a lawyer working on a dog case 
“should at once be enabled . . . to find what he is after by looking under the heading of dog cases; 
so with a cow case, horse case, etc.”170   Despite the shortcomings, Irving Browne argued that there 
had not been another time “when it was so easy to find out what has been decided - not to say, 
what the law is - as the present.”  Thus, “if one is forced to be a case-lawyer, and that seems to be 
inevitable now-a-days, there is no excuse for his not having ‘the last case’ at his fingers' ends, and 
for not being intimately acquainted with all its ancestors and brethren.”171   
English courts issued fewer decisions than American courts, but late nineteenth century 
commentators were ready to criticize the indexing and digesting systems put in place for the Law 
Reports.  Nathaniel Lindley’s 1885 “History of the Law Reports” included detailed criticisms of 
the Council of Law Reporting’s Law Reports Digest of Cases. Lindley found that its classification 
system used too few (and often poorly chosen) titles, the titles were not sufficiently subdivided 
into smaller divisions, and was “a Digest of cases, rather than of legal principles and rules with 
references to the eases which illustrate them.”172As late as 1939, A.L. Goodhart wrote: “It is a 
striking, although unfortunate, fact that it is less difficult to find the relevant American case among 
the 40,000 annually reported cases in that country than it is with the 750 in England: this is due to 
the centralized and efficient indexing system in the American reports.”173 
 
VI. Principle and Precedent at the Turn of the Century 
In the 1880s, some writers suggested that the continuing growth in published decisions might 
eventually overwhelm case-lawyers and force them to focus on legal principles.  James Campbell 
observed that the multitude of reported cases had “led to excessive citations, and thus produced 
confusion; but no court will listen to the indefinitely prolonged reading of authorities. However 
indulgent the bench may be to such repetitions, there must be required at some time a statement of 
                                                          
166 Current Topics, 45 ALB. L.J. 85.86 (1892). 
167 Current Topics, 46 ALB. L.J. 261, 261 (1892). 
168 A Word or Two, supra note 123, at 333. 
169 Report of the Committee on Law Reporting, 18 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 343, 354 (1895). The annex to the report 
provides detailed information about the currently published official reports. Id. at 362.  
170 [Anon.], Letter to the Editor, 1 GREEN BAG 407, 408 (1889). 
171 Irving Browne, The Lawyer's Easy Chair, 6 GREEN BAG 93, 93-94 (1894). 
172 Lindley, supra note 5, at 147. 
173 Goodhart, supra note 131, at 30-31. 
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the principle claimed to result from the aggregate….”174 In 1884, John Dillon told the ABA that 
as searching for precedents became increasingly onerous, the case-lawyer would be diminished 
and cases would be argued and decided based on “knowledge of the great, living, fundamental 
principles of our law and equity systems.”175 In 1888, an unsigned note in the American Law 
Review held that the number of published cases hindered the case-law researcher more than it 
helped: “there is scarcely a subject in this vast mass of case-made law upon which conflicting 
authorities, if authorities they can be called, may not be found…. it is hard to tell whether the 
successive efforts at rethinking the same question have been attended by any improvement of 
result.176 In 1892, while emphasizing that “[t]he multiplication of reports and decisions is evil 
altogether,” J.R. Lamar acknowledged the benefits of having new cases from all states “published, 
digested, and within a week after they are delivered, scattered into the offices of half of the lawyers 
of the Union ….” Among other things, access to the full multitude of cases would itself “so weaken 
their authority that the mere case lawyer will be practically useless …. Precedent will neutralize 
precedent. The bar will again be forced to the discussion of principles ….”177  In 1904, Edward B. 
Whitney suggested that judges had become more resistant to citation of precedents: “[A]s the 
wilderness of authorities presented upon the briefs of counsel tends every year to become more 
hopeless, the courts in general tend more and more to decide each case according to their own 
ideas of fairness, . . . and to pass the previous authorities by in silence . . . .” 178 
In addition, by the 1890s, more articles commented on the importance of understanding 
principles and precedents. J.W. McLoud pointed out that although “[t]he general principles of law 
have probably nearly all been discovered and settled,” how they are applied changes with changes 
in society.  The case-lawyer should not be commended, but “the lawyer who studies the most cases, 
will reach the most deserved eminence in his profession and success at the bar. There is more 
wisdom in the many than in the few. Lawyers should get wisdom from all sources.”179  In 1892 
Emlin McClain noted that the “practical lawyer” looks to find “discussion of the particular 
principles applicable to his concrete case, [but] especially he wants to find the adjudications 
involving facts similar to those of his case . . . .” 180 An 1895 ABA report on “the condition of law 
reporting” stated that because principles are found in published reports, “the ‘case lawyer’ wins 
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upon a critical examination are not very common. There is almost always some minute point of difference which 
will upset a whole line of cases apparently very similar to that under consideration.”). 
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cases because he has examined the books thoroughly….”181 R. McP. Smith argued that “principles 
are best learned by reading cases. The judge makes a fuller exposition of the principle than the 
text-writer. The facts elucidate it. The style of the opinion is more familiar--more like that of a 
good newspaper editorial--the best of style for such matter.”182 How could a lawyer advise his 
clients “if he were obliged to rely on his understanding of general principles which he might deem 
applicable to the complicated questions which are presented? How could the courts dispose of 
business if every case were to be argued and decided without regard to precedents?”183 A brief 
article in the Weekly Law Bulletin noted that “the growth and development of the law can be 
learned only from the decisions of the courts.” The problem was not that case-lawyers relied more 
on precedents than principles, but that many lawyers were not well-trained in analysis and 
comparison of cases.184  
In 1898, a letter to the editor of the Weekly Law Bulletin pondered whether there were as many 
case-lawyers as “the noise made about them presumes to exist.”  Although the expression suggests 
that case-lawyers are ignorant of legal principles, it was hard to see “how any man, without a well-
grounded knowledge of legal principles, can be even a good case-lawyer.  The ability to properly 
sift the enormous mass and select the right cases as precedents to gain the point he seeks to 
establish, presupposes a knowledge of the law.”185  But were there now too many cases for even 
the skilled case-lawyer to sort through? J.D. Shewalter told the Missouri Bar: “When we reflect 
that there is scarcely a mooted question upon which decisions cannot be found upon both sides …. 
the case lawyer of the future can hope for nothing but a confused and unfathomable sea of 
perplexity.”186    
Still, as the nineteenth century neared its close, Judge U. M. Rose told the Virginia Bar:  
[N]ow we are all either case lawyers, or are not lawyers at all. … Our legal arguments are 
for the most part a mere casino-like matching and unmatching of cases, involving little or 
no intellectual effort. The law is ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a 
mere question of patterns.187  
                                                          
181 Report of the Committee on Law Reporting (1895), supra note 171, at 354. Arkansas judge U.M. Rose noted in 
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Criticisms of the case-lawyer continued in the early twentieth century.  In his 1903 presidential 
address to the Association of American Law Schools, Simeon Baldwin argued: “The term ‘case-
lawyer’ is justly one of reproach.”188 John Dos Passos wrote that because searching for principles 
had become subordinated to seeking precedents, the modern lawyer “carries, as a soldier would a 
knapsack, a memory filled with sections of codes and adjudicated cases…. [his] nose is always to 
be found in a digest, ‘case’-law accumulating so fast that he must have indices to search for his 
precedents.”189  Theron Strong observed that “the effect of the large number of adjudged cases 
contained in the reports has virtually transformed the profession from a class of lawyers able to 
practice without law books to a class almost entirely dependent on the adjudged cases.”190  
Yet, a Law Notes article claimed that the researcher’s real problem was not the bulky body of 
case law, but the “clumsy and inferior tools” available for finding cases.191  A 1901 article in the 
Yale Law Journal acknowledged that the many digests, encyclopedias, and other case-finding tools 
were often poorly-compiled, but saw that they had “placed the youngest and oldest members of 
the profession on a level in the examination of authorities.”192 As a result, “the most nimble 
searcher among the digests triumphs over an opponent who relies on logical deduction from 
principle,” while “the persistent continuance in practice of elderly men is viewed with ill-
concealed impatience by the pushing members of a profession in which activity is more in demand 
than counsel.”193 Alfred Beveridge suggested that it was impossible to become a great lawyer 
without being well-read in Blackstone and other classic legal texts, as well as in the sciences, 
literature, and history, but he admonished young lawyers not to “go into a court without having 
thoroughly reviewed and mastered all the precedents bearing on every phase of your proposition.” 
194 
Some wondered why lawyers viewed the growth of knowledge in their field as an evil.195 In 
1901, a review of the forthcoming Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure questioned the complaints 
about the bulkiness of the professional literature, pointing out that other fields had developed over 
time by incorporating past knowledge into new and then discarding the old.  Lawyers had not put 
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aside older knowledge as new knowledge was created.  As a result, their knowledge base had only 
increased, leaving the modern lawyer “doomed to begin at, practically, the same point from which 
his predecessors of a hundred years ago took their start, and … [to] sift out for himself from the 
ever-increasing pile of chaff the grains of wheat for which he seeks.”196 With the continual addition 
of new cases, “knowledge of the law in its entirety has long been an utter impossibility, and every 
lawyer has become, of necessity, a ‘case lawyer,’ … forced to rely upon the text writers and 
digesters to guide him to the authorities.”197 The legal literature had fallen “further and further 
behind, until the necessity for radical improvements in the methods of law writing has become 
decidedly apparent, even to antiquated believers in general principles who deem a ‘case lawyer’ 
beneath contempt.”198   
Iowa judge A.N. Hobson noted the “contemptuous manner” in which some lawyers claimed 
the ability to resolve questions by applying principles without reference to cases.199 Hobson 
pointed out that because the principles applicable to non-statutory questions were themselves 
based in adjudicated cases, “no counsel can reasonably aspire to lasting success who does not study 
and understand the cases.”200 An article in the West Docket feared that, if other lawyers continued 
to sneer at the case lawyer, “knowledge of … objective authorities will have become a thing of the 
past, while subjective impressions from uninformed and feeble reasoners will be rampant, and our 
jurisprudence will be turned into a riot of loose thinking.”201 
Other early twentieth century commentators acknowledged that practitioners frequently had 
no choice but to thoroughly research the body of case law to lessen the chances that opposing 
counsel would unearth unfamiliar precedents they could not counter.  At the second meeting of the 
American Association of Law Libraries, Frank B. Gilbert described the work of the modern case-
lawyer: “he knows his facts and seeks to apply thereto the law . . . . In this immense maze of 
reported judicial determinations he may well think there is a case with facts like his which, if 
found, will be conclusive upon the tribunal which he seeks to convince.”202  
The West Publishing Company stood ready to facilitate a lawyer’s search for precedent, even 
as some critics complained that the law “has been seized upon and converted into an industrial 
scheme of gigantic proportions … for the manufacture of reports of decided cases of ponderous 
digests and of so-called treatises compiled by day laborers from the digests.”203 In the early 1900s, 
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West began taking an active role in training law students and practitioners to use its products.204  
Company representatives visited law schools to lecture on topics of legal bibliography205; in 
addition, the company started two journals,206 and published a legal research and writing 
textbook.207 In 1907 West representative Roger W. Cooley made the company philosophy clear in 
an American Law School Review article stating that “knowledge of the law is to a great degree a 
knowledge of precedents . . . to find cases showing how the principles have been applied . . . . [The 
lawyer] must use the facts as a guide, because the application arises out of the act, and not vice 
versa.208  Two years later, Cooley told an audience of law librarians that when a lawyer comes to 
the law library, he should already have worked out the principle to be applied to his problem: 
“[W]hat he wants now is cases applying that principle to facts on all fours with, or similar to the 
facts in his case.”209 The second edition of West’s textbook: Brief Making and the Use of Law 
Books, edited by Cooley, suggested that starting from a principle of law rather than the facts 
required: “First, that the lawyer knows exactly what principle governs his case; and, second, that 
he has such a thorough knowledge of the theory of classification on which his digest is based that 
he can turn to the particular topic where that principle is illustrated.”210  The descriptive word 
approach, which West was developing at the time,211 did not require the lawyer “to know the theory 
or rules of classification” and ignores “all considerations of the science and theory of digesting.”212   
In 1912 West introduced a comprehensive “Descriptive Word Index” consisting of “words and 
terms descriptive of the persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and 
remedies which have been the subject of litigation.”213 R. A. Daly, one of West’s law school 
instructors, wrote that the aim of legal research “if possible, is to find that case, or those cases, 
where, upon facts similar to the immediate question involved, some court has applied the law.”214 
In 1915 Daly suggested that the principles of law are “well known to the profession” from law 
school; but to apply principles in practice, “the court demands precedents; that is to say, the court 
asks for cases decided in the past in which the facts were essentially the same.”215  Precedents are 
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found by analyzing the facts of the case at hand and using the descriptive word index.216  In 1920 
he wrote that “finding the law in active practice means the locating of that adjudicated case where 
some court, somewhere, at some time, applied the principle to facts on all fours with or closely 
paralleling the facts of the case at bar.217  West’s publications were designed for lawyers needing 
to find that case. 
The situation of the case lawyer may have been captured best by Solicitor General John W. 
Davis in a 1916 talk before the Judicial Section of the A.B.A.218  Davis quoted a recent opinion 
that described the current bar as “an industrious, painstaking, far-reaching army of sleuths of the 
type Sherlock Holmes, hunting some precedent in some case, confidently assured that if the search 
be long enough and far enough some apparently parallel case may be found to justify even the 
most absurd and ridiculous contention.”219 
Davis justified the need to examine all published cases because of the courts’ reliance on 
precedent: “To make precedents the fount and origin of the law is to compel their study … to put 
a premium on this knowledge is to encourage its overexhibition by the overzealous.”220 As a result, 
“the case lawyer… is not wholly a self-made man…. [h]e is rather the product of an environment 
and of circumstances which he is powerless of his own motion to change or greatly modify.”221  
Speaking to an audience of judges, Davis suggested that the judiciary write fewer full opinions, 
write shorter opinions, cite fewer cases in their opinions, and publish them more selectively.222   
Does not the case for the case lawyer come to this: that so long as the law is based upon 
precedents, so long as judges multiply them, and so long as printing presses issue them, 
just so long will the case lawyer spend his time in their collection, and just so long will 
he belabor the courts with the fagots he has thus industriously bound?223  
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V. Conclusion: Are We All Case-Lawyers Now? 
American law and the legal environment changed dramatically in the nineteenth century,224 
then, as Lawrence Friedman put it, went “from a walk, to a run, to travel on a supersonic jet”225 in 
the twentieth.  Among the changes was what Friedman called the “law explosion,” which 
encompassed both the growth in the “sheer size and scale of the legal system,” and the quantity of 
“sheer legal stuff.”226 In 1916 John Davis had argued that case lawyering was perhaps inevitable 
in a system that put a premium on the knowledge in published cases, but he also saw that 
“overexhibition [of this knowledge] by the overzealous” was exacerbated by the ever-growing 
number of cases. 227  In the early part of the century, American Bar Association committees 
continued to study the problems created by the growth in law books, sometimes in collaboration 
with other organizations, but ultimately without much result.228  The 1923 report calling for 
establishment of the American Law Institute cited “the great volume of recorded decisions” as a 
significant cause of the two chief defects of American law: “its uncertainty and its complexity.”229 
Advocates for restatements of the law suggested that the weight of the reported cases might break 
down the legal system.230 In lectures published as The Growth of the Law, Benjamin Cardozo 
called “the multiplication of decisions” the greatest cause of uncertainty in the law, suggesting that 
“[t]he fecundity of our case law would make Malthus stand aghast.”231  
  Yet, complaints about the difficulties of locating precedent became less frequent, even as the 
body of published law continued to grow.  As early as 1917, librarian Mary Foote observed that 
the bar’s criticisms were “now directed almost entirely to the problems of time and expense; 
difficulty in finding the law is scarcely mentioned.”  For Foote: “the increased facilities for the 
examination of legal authorities have almost kept pace with their multiplication.”232 By the mid-
1920s, American lawyers had nearly forty years’ experience with West’s American Digest and its 
classification system. The Century Edition of the digest covered cases through 1896; pamphlets 
and annual digests indexed and organized newly decided cases; and a third decennial compilation 
was in progress. Descriptive word indexes designed to facilitate fact-based research were widely 
available. Other publishers based the classifications in their books on the West system.233  
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With the start of the Great Depression in 1929, law librarians and others became more vocal 
regarding the budget and space problems posed by the multiplicity and duplication of law books, 
and much less was said about problems finding the law in the reports.234 Although occasionally 
harsh criticisms of case-lawyers appeared through the middle of the twentieth century, they were 
few235 and mostly historical.236  
In 1977 Myron Jacobstein found that, although the “literature on court reporting is abundant 
with dire predictions related to the flood of opinions,” the number of recent articles on the topic 
had declined dramatically.237 Jacobstein attributed the lessened concern to newer specialized 
research tools which reduced the impacts of the overall growth in published case law for lawyers 
working in areas with significant legislative and administrative components.238 After the 1930s, 
topical loose-leaf services became important research tools for many practice areas, bringing 
together up-to-date versions of statutes, regulations and other material, as well as reporting new 
                                                          
the approval of the majority of the librarians.” Comments of Harvey T. Reid, editor-in-chief of West Publishing 
Company); Urban A. Lavery, A Formula for Finding the Law, 25 A.B.A. J. 911, 912, n. 2 (1939) (noting that the 
Standard Classification system had “long dominated the law book world”). 
234 See generally Danner (2012), supra note 230, at 496-501. 
235 In 1928 R. P. Taylor wrote: “The case lawyer stands for reversion to animism. A case is not with him the 
illustration of a principle so much as a fetish to be invoked and worshipped as a special dispensation of the only 
providence it is given him professionally to know.”  R. P. Taylor, Bards in Ermine: John Marshall, 62 AM. L. REV. 
801, 819 (1928). As late as 1950 Leon McCord found “one of the most dangerous and undermining influences in the 
legal profession today” to be “the rabid ‘case lawyer’ [who] in the most dangerous sense . . . will not apply the 
correct law to the proven facts, but . . . attempts to twist and distort the facts so as to bring them within totally 
inapplicable rules and decisions found to be in his favor.”  Leon McCord, The Right of It, 2 ALA. L. REV. 261, 262 
(1950).  
After 1920, searches for “case lawyer” in the Hein Online Law Journals library mostly turn up references to 
types of litigators in such phrases as “small case lawyer,” “test case lawyer,” “rate case lawyer,” “patronage case 
litigator,” “civil case lawyer,” etc. 
236 Some memorials and tributes noted whether a prominent attorney was considered to be a case-lawyer. See, e.g., 
Arthur W. MacLean, Lemuel Shaw and His Influence upon American Jurisprudence, 4 TEMP. L.Q. 148, 151 (1930) 
(“Like John Marshall, [Lemuel Shaw] was not a "case lawyer," and precedents were not so plentiful then as now. In 
one of his opinions, twenty-four pages long, not a single case is cited.”); The Late James C. Carter, 11 VA. L. REG. 
12, 13 (1905) (“He was not a case lawyer and did not cumber his briefs by an immense citation of authorities.”). 
For comments on more contemporary figures, see Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
181, 182 (1941) (“Mr. Justice Brandeis was the antithesis of a ‘case lawyer.’ To no one less than to him was a case a 
discrete phenomenon. It was an organism. It had antecedents and offspring.”); John Van Voorhis, Cardozo and the 
Judicial Process Today, 71 YALE L.J. 202, 204 (1961) (Cardozo “was anything but a case lawyer. He believed that 
lawsuits should be decided according to principles, derived from experience and understanding of every branch of 
life, of which the existing case law is only a part.”).  Robert Jackson was praised for being a case lawyer. See Paul 
A. Freund, Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights, in MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTURES IN HIS HONOR 29, 
37 (1969) (“Justice Jackson was, above all--and this was one of his great strengths--a case lawyer.”). 
237 J. Myron Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 791, 795 (1975). 
238 Jacobstein acknowledged that small practitioners and lawyers working with criminal law, landlord tenant issues, 
and domestic relations had fewer alternatives to the general reports. Id. at 795-76. Jacobstein wrote shortly after the 
introduction of Lexis and Westlaw, and does not mention either service or their possible impacts on publication of 
appellate cases. See also Byron D. Cooper, The Role of Publishing Houses in Developing Legal Research and 
Publication: The United States, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 611, 626-27 (1990) (“The prevalence of looseleaf 
services, digests, indexes, citators, and online full text databases has made researching the mass of published case 
law manageable.”). 
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case law.239 In the last quarter of the century, as lawyers began to rely on legal research databases 
like Lexis and Westlaw, and then the Internet, to locate case law and other legal information, 
digests and other print-based tools became less important.240  A number of writers analyzed the 
impacts of the changes on the practice of legal research, and the potential loss of structure that the 
digests had provided.241 In the early twenty-first century, American lawyers continue to face 
growth (and duplication) in published court opinions and other sources of law, but concerns about 
the amount of law have taken second place to efforts to make all of it widely accessible. Initiatives 
to promote free or low-cost access to digital sources of legal information for lawyers and the public 
began to appear to appear in the 1990s and have continued.242  
In the late 1800s publishers who favored more selective publication of cases sometimes 
disparaged West Publishing Company’s effort to publish all appellate cases as the “blanket” 
system of publication.243  John B. West embraced the term, seeing his company as providing a 
blanket insurance policy to protect lawyers from losing cases because they did not find all 
decisions on point.244  Access to published case law in the twentieth century contrasted sharply 
with the nineteenth century, when a lawyer’s recourse was limited “to the digest of the reports in 
the state in which he ‘hung out his shingle,’ -- if there was a digest,” or “to the United States Digest 
. . . incomplete as it was in extent, and inconvenient as it was in use.”245 The West reporters and 
digests gave lawyers confidence that could find what they needed, and helped quiet concerns about 
case lawyers.  In the twentieth century, we were all case-lawyers, as Judge Rose had predicted in 
1896.  In the twenty-first, lawyers and others needing legal information look less frequently to 
digests than to networked digital sources to find the cases and other law they need.  Some research 
suggests that electronic research tools encourage lawyers to search for “directive language from 
higher courts” to apply to their current cases, lessening their need to study full opinions.246  Could 
                                                          
239 For discussion of such services in the 1940s, see FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL 
RESEARCH 300-19 (3d. rev. ed. 1942). Compare with the briefer treatment in Hicks’s second edition, prepared by a 
research assistant. FREDERICK C. HICKS, MATERIALS AND METHODS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 249-255 (2d. rev. ed. 
1933) (written by Elliott R. Katz). By the 1980s, Bob Berring and Valerie Wedin would call loose-leaf services 
“perhaps the most important tool in legal literature today.” Robert C. Berring & Valerie Wedin, Looseleaf Services: 
A Subject Bibliography, LEGAL REFERENCE SERVICES Q., Winter 1981 at 51. 
240 Bob Berring observed that by 2000, “[l]aw students come to law school trained in Internet searching, fully 
conversant with modem search engines and interfaces. Rather than having legal information shape their perceptions 
of the world, they are shaping legal information to their existing information world.” Robert C. Berring, Legal 
Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 305, 313 (2000). 
241 In 2002, Allan Hanson wrote that “[b]ecause indexing identifies particulars in isolation, research with automated 
tools promotes a view of the subject matter as a depthless congeries of facts and doctrines rather than the 
hierarchically organized system that presents itself in research with print sources.  F. Allan Hanson, From Key 
Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 575 (2002).  
242 Currently active examples include: the Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/, last visited January 16, 2016; Law.Gov, a project of Public.Resource.Org, 
https://law.resource.org/index.law.gov.html, last visited January 16, 2016; and the Harvard Law School Free the 
Law Project, http://librarylab.law.harvard.edu/projects/free-the-law, last visited January 16, 2016. 
243 An 1888 note commented that “So far as blanket or waste-basket reporting is concerned, the Wests now have the 
entire field to themselves, and those who have dabbled in that business no doubt feel that they are welcome to it.” 
Note: The Lawyer’s Reports Annotated, supra note 178, at 921.   
244 Symposium of Law Publishers, supra note 154, at 406-07. 
245 Kerr, supra note 215, at 284. 
246 Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?  165 U. PA. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 27) (http://ssrn.com/abstract=2748666) The authors point out that their findings of greater reliance on 
“directive language” in published opinions of higher courts tend to support Peter Tiersma’s argument that “the 
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this be seen as a new form of case-lawyering?  It appears safe to say that, regardless of changes in 
publishing formats and the tools available to locate precedents, and perhaps also in how they use 
the precedents they find, American lawyers remain case-lawyers now as they have been since 
increasing numbers of cases became accessible to them in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
                                                          
language of opinions is increasingly being viewed as authoritative text, not all that different from statutes.” Peter 
Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1187, 1247 (2007). 
